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EXECUTIVE SUMARY 
This Report summarizes the results of the studies performed by the JRC/IE in 
2007 on Task 2 of the SONIS research program which is devoted to the Safety 
of Nuclear Installations. The aim of this task is to identify the fire related 
parameters associated to the design basis scenarios for accidental and 
deliberate events, and to identify the Structures, Systems, and Components 
(SSCs) where the vulnerabilities are important for the overall safety evaluation 
of the plants.  
Target beneficiaries of this study are member states regulatory bodies who will 
find a state of the art of fire resistance standards for SSCs at Nuclear Power 
Plants as well as EC General Directions which promote international agreement 
on safety standards. 
Today it is still difficult to determine fire resistance parameters for certain plant 
components, in particular for electrical and I&C components. In this study a 
subset of SSCs has been selected independently from the origin of the fire, 
namely the most relevant electrical components and those which ensure 
compartment tightness. Their fire resistance is fundamental in making 
assumptions for Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment studies and for the 
conclusion of such studies.  
This report also collects information on norms and standards relevant to fire 
safety as well as their corresponding fire resistance tests for electrical cables 
and electrical cabinets. 
Fire doors, fire dampers and fire seals to ensure compartment tightness were 
not considered in the same comprehensive way but the norms, standards and 
corresponding tests were also listed when available.   
The information presented in this document has two fields of application:  
• improvement of Fire PSA assumptions relevant to component behaviour; 
• comparison of norms that can facilitate selection of components in case 
of fire safety upgrading or equipment refurbishment programs.  
The component fire resistance has been widely identified as a fundamental 
issue and is currently supported by several national or international ambitious 
experimental programs. This report prepares the next step of the SONIS 
program which will consist in estimating (together with the main key 
stakeholders in the “fire” community from Europe, the OECD countries, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine): 
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• to which extent national norms and standards consider the requirements 
on SSCs and fire barriers of nuclear power plants;  
• if experimental programs are mature enough to allow fire resistance test 
definition for SSCs without appropriate certificates. 
This work will be continued in 2008. 
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1 Introduction 
The new European Commission Direct Action SONIS addresses the R&D in 
relation to operational safety of nuclear installations. One of the most relevant 
tasks is covering the engineering programs in particular fire safety [1]. In fact, 
despite of the many efforts spent by operators, consultants and researchers, the 
fire still remains a challenge for both new and old plant design [2].  
For new reactor designs fire is going to play a significant role in the overall 
safety assessment, as the reactor operation events are better controlled by the 
innovative design features. Moreover, large fire scenarios are often requested 
to be evaluated in relation to the design basis of new plants and in the 
assessment of current installations. Even if all nuclear installations are 
sufficiently designed to response the internal fires they still need to be assessed 
in relation to a broader selection of fire scenarios, including also the “large fire” 
induced ones.  
There are different methods of fire safety assessment applicable to the nuclear 
installations. A conventional fire hazard analysis is based on the assumption of 
the presence of combustible materials in the plant compartments and limited 
number of contemporaneous sources of fire. In addition, conventional fire safety 
assessment relies upon the presence of mitigation measures, upon physical 
separation of redundant safety relevant control command and upon fire related 
operational procedures 
In view of such scenarios where a significant portion of the site is affected by 
fire ignited either on-site or off-site, conventional assessment techniques need 
to be reconsidered. In this frame several topics need special focussing: 
• Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) access policy 
• Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) fire resistance design 
margins 
• Emergency planning: availability of escape routes and relations with the 
township fire brigade 
• Decision making process 
The R&D carried out in this new EC action addresses both the deterministic and 
probabilistic safety assessment of SSC capability to withstand large fires ignited 
at the site by both internal and external sources. In this framework, the 
component qualification in relation to the new scenarios seems to be the area 
where more R&D is needed. 
Although the fire modelling capabilities are improving, there are still many 
assumptions in Fire Probability Safety Analysis studies that need to be 
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simplified with respect to the SSC behaviour during the fire. For example an 
electronic component like a computer main board is usually supposed to 
operates until its ambient temperature limit as given by the constructor, which is 
often around 40°C.  Without further proof of fire resistance such simplifications 
are unavoidable. However if large fires are considered that may affect 
independent circuitries of SSCs it is clear that assessed margins are required.    
Fire hazard analysis in particular Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment are 
encouraged and supported by a series of guidelines issued by the IAEA [3], [4]. 
Within the past 15 years a great amount of work has been carried out, 
especially in Eastern European countries, for enhancing the safety level of 
nuclear power plants. Obviously fire protection programs were also part of these 
efforts (e.g. [5]). In the same period of time the market has become open and 
basically any component provider in the EU is entitled to compete in tender 
calls. As a result the question of component quality and performance as 
established by a certification procedure and in connection with the component 
margins is a basic requirement for both the buyer and supplier. So there was a 
need to identify the relevant norms and associated tests for fire sensible 
components.  
In response to these two challenges of different nature (specific large fire 
scenario and EU open market) a comparison of available qualification 
procedures of SSCs for fire related effects is being carried out in SONIS. For 
SSCs where either no data or test procedures are available, the project includes 
the development of new test procedures, based on the outcome of analysis of 
the current practice and experiments for fire rating of SSCs.  
This report gathers the state-of-the-art information on codes and standards as 
well as experience developed in some countries. It focuses on norms and 
standards relevant to fire safety together with the corresponding tests, as they 
are in force in several EU countries, USA, Russian Federation and in Ukraine. 
In chapter 2 of this report: "Large fire scenarios and equipment concerned" the 
large fire scenario for nuclear power plants is discussed. The objective in 
chapter 3: "Deficiencies identified by experimental programs" is to list and 
provide as much information as possible about the behaviour of fire safety 
relevant components as revealed by several fire experimental programs. 
Chapter 3 focuses on two components: cables and electrical cabinets. In 
chapter 4 "Equipment fire resistance tests" the norms and standards identified 
for these two components are listed. Finally chapter 5 "Fire Related Norms and 
Standards" as well as chapter 6 "Conclusion and recommendations for future 
activities" summarize the main conclusions of what still remains to be 
addressed. 
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2 Large fire scenarios and equipment concerned 
In its work program 2007, the task 2 of SONIS refers to "large size" fires. 
According to the Building Research Establishment of UK in its project for Design 
Fires Database [6] "The selection and prescription of the 'design fire scenario' is 
one of the primary uncertainties in fire safety engineering… …Assumptions are 
often based on available information, which might relate to intended use, 
experience, tests of individual items or materials, or the analysis of real fires". 
This also applies to NPP buildings.  
The concept of the "large fire scenario" is related to the assumption that through 
deliberate ignition several redundant trains could be affected at the same time 
and in such a way that the component limits could be reached simultaneously 
on several independent trains. This assumption calls for a reassessment of 
SCCs fire resistance margins. However a clear assessment of these margins is 
of broader interest since it can be useful for the Fire Probability Safety 
Assessment. Such probabilistic assessment studies are as a rule required by 
the regulatory authorities, whereas the large fire scenario consideration is not 
required through licensing steps. 
Four topics have to be dealt with when investigating NPPs fires of internal origin 
as well as large size fires of deliberate origin:  
• the fire prevention, status of passive fire safety barriers 
• the fire size 
• the consequence of fire on the reactor safe shutdown  
• the fire fighting issues 
Two types of fires (internal and external) differs one of each other mainly by the 
prevention aspect. In case of the large fire scenario of external origin not only 
the NPP has the responsibility for the fire prevention measures. It is the 
responsibility of NPP to conduct strict survey of the surroundings and of wares 
and persons entering the site. However the prevention measures are to be 
discussed between the NPP and the local nuclear regulatory authorities as well 
as with the local internal affairs authorities. Adopted strategies can be valuable 
for other NPPs but are usually not shared due to security reasons. This aspect 
is not considered in the SONIS project.  
The fire size is in fact not a typical characteristic of the so called "large fires" 
supposed to be originated by a deliberate action with regard to the so-called 
"conventional" fires that could be originated as a result of human or equipment 
failures during NPP daily operation. Even though the passive fire barriers1 
                                                 
1 Fire doors, fire penetrations, fire dampers, fire cable seals. 
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(compartment concept) play a major role in the passive fire protection [7] by 
limiting the size and propagation of any fire, a conventional fire can propagate 
and become a multi-compartment fire if not detected or controlled early enough 
and if the status of fire barriers in the NPP is disregarded (e.g. open or 
improperly rated doors, fire dampers, etc.). The relevant items for the fire size 
appear to be the compartment design (including passive fire barriers), the 
compartment tightness and the fire load. As a result component characteristics 
and fire safety culture have to be considered, and indeed these aspects 
significantly contribute to any Fire Risk Analysis and Fire Probability Safety 
Assessment study. 
There are several important aspects to be considered for reactor safe shutdown 
following the fire. These involve aspects linked to design and layout of 
compartments containing reactor protection elements, cable layout (any 
potential cross out between redundant trains), and the fire resistance of 
concerned equipment as well as appropriate escape routes towards the remote 
shut down panel(s). Above aspects are not dependent of the fire origin.  
The fire fighting is however related to its progress and size and not to its origin 
(see figure 1). Fire policies developed and drilled for conventional fires can be 
taken over for fires of deliberate origin, with a special emphasis on decision 
making, on the availability of escape routes and on the involvement of township 
brigade and its material. 
↓ ↓ ↓
Prevention only at 
NPP
↓
Fire of deliberate 
origin
Fire because of 
human/material 
failure
↓
↓ ↓
Safety 
Culture
Prevention not only at 
NPP
Size of the fire
↑
SSC 
margins Fight
↓
 
 
Figure 1: Once the prevention has failed the size of a fire and its consequences on the SSC 
margins and on the fight do not depend upon its origin. 
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The analysis of the large fire scenario assumption results in the following three 
questions: 
 
? Is it necessary to reconsider the compartment organisation: the 
fire load and the status of existing fire barriers? 
? Are the equipment fire margins well established and reliable to 
ensure safe reactor shut down and residual heat removal? 
? Is it necessary to define alternative escape routes, to review 
decision making scenario and involvement of neighbouring fire 
brigades? 
The first and third items are to be locally addressed by each individual NPP and 
their local authorities. The second item has two components: one related to the 
local fire safety culture, including the surveillance of the components, and 
another related to the original plant design with respect to fire thread. 
Task 2 of the SONIS project concentrates on this last aspect. Key components 
were selected and their behaviour under the fire was studied in accordance with 
established experimental program and results published in the literature. The 
applicable norms and standards relevant to rated fire equipment were reviewed, 
and also tests and acceptance criteria to prove the fire resistance of equipment 
were investigated 
In the reporting period of the project we focused on the qualification of 
components for fire resistance with the following questions: 
• What are the current design requirements? 
• How are they distributed in different countries operating nuclear 
installations?  
• Do present or past experimental programs have potential to identify 
deficiencies and improve fire requirements? 
• Is there any recommendation that can be derived from this phase of the 
project? 
In line with the resources available for this task this report focuses on two widely 
used components: electrical cabinets and cables and, in a smaller extent, 
components related to passive fire barriers to prevent fire propagation in the 
plant. 
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3 Deficiencies identified by experimental programs 
3.1 Cables and wires 
Currently there are number of different methods to determine the fire resistance 
of fire-related cable performance test methods that are being used in different 
regions of the world. These are for example [8], [25]: 
• VW1 / IEC 60332-1 / FT-1 / CPD Class E 
• UL 1581 Tray / IEC 60332-3 / FT-2 / CPD Class D 
• UL 1666 Riser / FT-4 / CPD Class C & B2 
• NFPA 262 / EN 50289 / FT-6 / CPD Class B1 
• NFPA 255 & NFPA 259 / LC / CPD Class B1+ 
• IEC 60331 / EN ISO 1716 
Each test has the objective to simulate the fire hazard in various sections of a 
building. Key parameters such as ignition source output, airflow and duration of 
the test differentiate these cable fire performance tests.  
In Europe, scale tests such as IEC 60332-1 (Bunsen burner test) and the IEC 
60332-3 (vertical tray test) are the predominant tests methods to measure 
ignition and flame height and heat release respectively. Smoke generation has 
never been integrated as a full-scale fire test criteria in most European 
specifications for fire safety. If specific smoke compliance is required, it is 
generally evaluated in a separate test known as IEC 61034. 
Until now, there has been little harmonization between the American and 
European cable fire performance standards. Therefore in Europe, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards have evolved over 
the years mainly due to the individual European national standards 
organizations and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC). 
Between 1999 and 2004 the European Commission’s Fire Regulators Group 
(consisting of representatives from each member country) reviewed various 
proposals to create a fire performance hierarchy for cables installed in building 
based on the FIPEC study [9] (Fire Performance of Electrical Cables). In March 
[25] 2004, the European Fire Regulators Group put forth their recommendations 
for the initial hierarchy of cable fire performance requirements. Vertical test 
methods are actually modifications to the IEC 60332-3 referencing two FIPEC 
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scenarios. Smoke and acidity tests are currently (and may be in the future) not 
a requirement for cables but fall into an “additional classification”.  
Experimental results [2] show that both short-term and long-term damage is 
possible in a smoke exposure environment (due to intermittent contact 
problems circuit bridging problems, direct corrosive attack). 
In many EU countries the direct and indirect fire effects have been simulated in 
numerous experimental programs such as: 
• Germany - HDR experiments (oil, cables etc.) for all types of codes at the 
Research Centre of Karlsruhe, and cable fire experiments at iBMB of TU 
Braunschweig. 
• France – PEPSI (cable damage and electrical cable analytical test), 
EPSILON tests (inflammation and propagation conditions of the fire for a 
given set of cable trays) 
• Finland - PALOTUB fire research program (defining temperature 
threshold limits for typical equipment) 
Fire simulation tools such as models and codes are experimentally validated on 
these tests and therefore represent a modern tool in the frame of deterministic 
and probabilistic fire safety assessment. 
These experimental works generally concluded that the fire modeling is 
currently affected by the lack of knowledge on a realistic incineration behavior of 
several combustibles such as, for example, cable insulation materials. The 
impact of smoke and other fire products has also not been modeled or 
analytically studied in detail. Finally, there is also a common agreement on the 
need to develop further tools to evaluate the uncertainty and sensitivity 
associated to simulations since the objective is to evolve from the current 
conservative studies to a “realistic plus uncertainties” one. 
Each EU country uses different approaches during their analysis (ex. cable 
damage temperatures show great variation amongst countries.) 
Here follow some models that are used in EU countries for analyzing the impact 
of smoke and heat on equipment: 
• Finland – the impact of smoke is not assessed explicitly. Cables are 
currently modeled as parts of the safety systems they serve. In the case 
of a fire damaging power cables, the corresponding safety systems are 
considered unavailable. Fire safety has to be demonstrated by passive 
measures and complimentary active ones if necessary. A risk associated 
with fire has to be extremely low. This implies the necessity to assess 
and validate cable models in realistic conditions with all the possible 
combinations of conditions (actuation of detectors, ventilation properties, 
location of fire dampers/doors, temperature history, oxygen content etc). 
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• France - Functional analyses for the cable damage are performed. 
Damage to cables can either cause a plant transient or lead to the 
unavailability of a safety-related item of equipment. Three types of 
electric cables to be analyzed: power cables, control cables, 
instrumentation cables. As a general rule fire damages the insulators and 
leads to leakage leading either to the actuation of the protection system 
(loss of component) or for instrumentation out of scale readings. 
• Spain - Shorts between wires leading to spurious signals or equipment 
actuation cannot be excluded and are analyzed, particularly for safety 
related components, e.g., pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves. 
• United Kingdom - Fire spread within a zone was assumed to be complete 
given a fire initiation and failure of automatic detection and suppression 
systems. Specific consideration of the effects of smoke on 
instrumentation electronics or electrical equipment has not been 
addressed. In the safety case, it has been assumed that a fire will lead to 
failure of all the safety significant equipment within a segregated zone.  
General trend for the new power plant design (e.g. EPR in Finland) is to adopt 
an adequate design of cable traces and compartments layout including fire 
safety barriers (e.g. fire doors, fire penetrations, fire dampers) in order to have 
effective passive fire protection. Active fire fighting systems (e.g. sprinklers, 
deluge, extinguishers, etc) should only be complimentary to the previous ones. 
Though electrical cables must be tested according to international norms and 
standards for their required fire resistance so that to demonstrate that the 
massive cable fire is very unlikely at the plant [10]. 
An extensive study on the fire behaviour of cables has been performed by the 
iBMB [11]. Tests have been performed in small (cone calorimeter), intermediate 
(IEC test facility) and real scale (iBMB) test facilities. It was shown that only with 
full scale tests the influence of a set of key parameters can be evaluated such 
as preliminary heating and cable arrangement. 
A significant experimental effort has also been performed by the United States 
of America (USA) [12] to evaluate the cable response during a fire 
(CAROLFIRE) in bench-scale and intermediate scale tests. This program 
objective was to investigate spurious cable actuation when cables are subject to 
fire and to reduce the uncertainty in predicting cable damage with fire models. 
 
3.2 Electrical cabinets 
Fires in electrical cabinets are of major concern in nuclear power plants 
because they may disrupt the delivery of electrical power and instrumentation 
and control in the plant [13]. Published work on electrical cabinets is scarce; 
however several series of experiments have been performed by Sandia 
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National Laboratories (SNL) [14], Technical Centre of Finland (VTT) [15], [16] 
and French "Institut de Radioprotection et Sûreté Nucléaire" (IRSN) [17], [18]. 
These studies provided heat release rates (HRR) and thermal conditions based 
on the investigated experimental parameters i.e. amount and location of fuel 
load, ventilation configuration and cabinet dimensions. The influence of the fuel 
load (cable type) and of the ventilation as extracted from VTT and SNL work (in 
reference [13]) appears in Table 1. In addition the first series of the PICSEL 
program [18] exhibits a difference from 1 to 40 between the Heat Release Rate 
of a fire in an electrical cabinet having close doors compared to a similar fire 
with open doors.  
 
Cable type ventilation 
Cabinet 
Temperatures 
(°C) 
HRR (kW) 
Test 
series 
 
Not 
IEEE-
363 
qualified 
IEEE-
363 
qualified 
Open 
cabinet 
Close 
cabinet peak average peak average 
SNL X   X 300 200 175 100 
 X  X  950 600 955 500 
  X X    56  
VTT X2  X3   50  
 X1 X4    350  
 
Table 1: results extracted from [13] and [15] 
 
In the CARMELA experiments [18] the combustion sequence of electrical 
cabinets has been found remarkably reproducible allowing an identification of 5 
stages with specific law of HRR evolution inside each stage. This allows in turn 
a typical modelling which was the aim of the research program. Similarly to 
what has been observed in the SNL and VTT experiments the ventilation (size 
and position of the openings) had the main influence on the peak HRR and also 
on the time to flashover, though for this effect the nature of the combustible had 
a greater influence. 
One of the aims of VTT experiments was to gain knowledge about the lowest 
ignition power needed to ensure established burning in the cabinet. It was found 
that statistical scatter in determining experimentally the ignition limit can be 
considerable [15].  The same observation is reported in [17] referring to 
separate normative ignition tests which resulted in time for ignition that proved 
to be highly variable.  Moreover this last parameter is thought to influence the 
time to flashover which has been found somewhat random with regard to the 
analysed parameters. 
                                                 
2 Variety of cables & wires 
3 Experiment 5 in [15] 
4 Experiment 4 in [15] 
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Due to progress in the modelling as a result of better knowledge gained from 
these experiments scenarios involving cable tunnel and electronics room fire 
have been modelled under probabilistic simulation [19]. An assessed zone 
model is used to model smoke spreading and gas temperature during the fire 
and a Monte-Carlo approach is used for random sampling to handle the 
variability of the scenarios. Rank order correlations are used to identify both 
modelling parameters and actual facility properties that have the most influence 
on the results. It was found that the critical cable temperature in the first case 
(cable tunnel) and the cabinet door opening in the second case (electronics 
room) were the physical variables which exhibited the second highest 
correlation for target failure time (after HRR). In all the experiments already 
discussed above the key role of the ventilation conditions in the cabinet was 
demonstrated. In particular the importance of mechanical properties and 
resistance to opening in response to thermal stress has been put in evidence. 
According to [20] there is probably room for improving the damage criteria 
based on the allowed environmental temperature of the electronics. In this 
paper specific electric components are tested in relation to their effective 
damage temperature in order to estimate time left before a component really 
fails. Tests were made for pressure transducer and valve actuator driven by an 
electrical motor. A theoretical model was derived and in this way critical times 
were obtained. Such an approach is valuable for individual components 
because the boundary conditions can be correctly measured/estimated. It will 
remain a difficult task to estimate critical time to failure for an electronic cabinet 
and the components inside it because the ventilation contributes as a critical 
parameter. 
A comprehensive investigation of the vent effect has been conducted in [13] by 
the University of Maryland, USA, with the objective of characterising electrical 
cabinets as fire initiators and ranking them as to their potential for initiating an 
external fire given a fire within the cabinet. A matrix of NPP typical electrical 
cabinets has been set up with a classification by voltage, function and 
construction (size, inside division, venting etc…) and 39 tests have been carried 
out. Again the main factors affecting the combustion process have been the fuel 
characteristics, the cabinet size and arrangement (presence or not of an inside 
shelve) as well as the vent openings and leakage paths. The test matrix allowed 
drawing some important features (from [13]):  
• Cabinets without ventilation openings can support steady-state fires with 
a heat release rate lower than 50kW depending on the cabinet airflow 
paths. 
• There is a limiting opening size in either of the top or of the bottom 
opening that will prevent the fire from being sustained. 
• Open cabinets present a very different fire scenario as compared with 
closed or partially closed cabinets. 
• The most relevant fuel for fire hazard is the jacket of the electrical cables 
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• Open cabinets with walls covered with cables and electrical stands are of 
special concern. 
• Closed cabinets with a small quantity of cables will be less likely to 
develop hazardous fire conditions. 
Impact of smoke on the control electronic has been studied in some extend in 
[21] and more recently in [22] and [23].  
The state of the art report has been issued by the OECD/NEA in 2000 [2] 
dealing with the way impact of smoke is addressed in PSAs. In Finland the 
Loviisa PSA study takes into account the allowed environmental temperature of 
the electronics but no specific smoke effect is accounted for. The case is similar 
in France where model analyses of fire in an electrical cabinet set damage 
criteria of the electronic cabinet at 40°C (which again corresponds to the 
allowed environmental temperature of the electronics). As a result of this 
conservative damage criteria smoke effects are not considered. In the same 
OECD report Japan studies planned to consider specific failure criteria for board 
as a result of board fire experiments.  
Switzerland developed a specific approach based on a review of fires reported 
from NPPs for estimating the likelihood of smoke damage on the switchgear 
minimal cut-sets. A law is derived which is useful for PSA studies but is not 
applicable for component standardisation. UK didn't consider the effect of 
smoke on instrumentation electronics or electrical equipment specifically; 
however research in this topic were indicated as planned. In USA conservative 
damage temperatures based upon equipment properties are used but smoke 
damage is not treated explicitly.  
Number of NPPs are currently replacing original analogue with digital 
instrumentation and control systems. Therefore, qualification guidelines for new 
systems are to be reviewed. A contribution to this task is reported in [23] where 
the vulnerability of digital components to smoke is investigated. Coating of 
functional circuit board (parylene, polyurethane, acrylic, silicone and epoxy) 
could be ranked as a function of their behaviour at smoke exposition under 
high-fuel load and high-humidity (75%) exposition. Connectors did not failed, 
but memory chips did with the exception of non-volatile SRAMs. However all of 
the chips that failed during the test recovered after enough venting. Hard disks 
were smoke tolerant as well and no hard disk failed during 2h of the smoke 
exposure.  
Finally corrosion induced on electronic circuits through smoke is a problem that 
occurs over days or weeks and hence only concerns post-fire recovery actions. 
Standards on the acceptance of recovered equipment are scarce [21], the issue 
is not considered further in our task. 
Hence as a result of the reviewed experimental programs decisive parameters 
for the behaviour of electrical cabinets under fire are: 
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• Cables and electronic boards characteristics 
• Ventilation configuration and leakages 
• Mechanical resistance to the heat stress (opening of the cabinet doors) 
• Size and internal division of the cabinet 
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4 Equipment fire resistance tests 
Utilities build their defence against fire events through Fire Protection Plans and 
Fire Hazards Assessment studies that have to be presented to the regulatory 
bodies. Complementary to Fire Hazard Analysis, fire PSAs are also required in 
some EU countries. An important feature of fire defence is the division of the 
space in compartments that have to be air leak-proof between each other. 
Compartments are secured in this sense by fire doors, fire penetrations, and fire 
dampers that have to withstand the fire for a certain period of time (often 1-3 
hours) which is given by the regulatory authority as a result of the safety 
analysis, so that to prevent the fire propagation to adjacent compartments (see 
e.g. [24]). 
Due to the lack of more realistic data the component fire impact criteria has to 
be selected in a conservative way by fire PSA studies. This is the case for 
example in Germany, in Finland, in the USA and in France where in the 
absence of tests it is assumed that the damage of equipment occurs when 
temperature reaches its design temperature [2]. The fire PSA in particular 
always needs some assumptions, which sometimes rely on deterministic 
assessment that help selecting or favouring a specific assumption. Using the 
fire rated equipment with proven fire resistance should allow reducing the 
spectrum of assumptions through a better assessment of the fire resistance 
capabilities. 
The usual mode of proving the fire resistance is the success to normative tests. 
They can be numerous and have their own historical, geographical and scope 
justifications. A good example of this diversity (concerning cables and wires) is 
given by the comprehensive review in [8]. In Europe there is a common 
approach to replace the various national standards by international ones: IEC or 
ISO. In Eastern Europe since reactors are of Russian design the Russian 
standards often apply, unless the country adopted the IEC standards or 
developed its own standards.  
A list of applicable fire safety relevant standards applying in some European 
countries, in USA, the Russian Federation and in Ukraine is presented in 
chapter 5. The list is not complete and it will be continued in the course of the 
project. Usually fire norms for NPP buildings are not different from those 
relevant for other industrial buildings. Norms for equipment related to 
propagation prevention concern fire doors, dampers and penetration seals. 
Norms for cables are more specifically presented in the following paragraph, 
and norms for electrical cabinets do not exist up to now. 
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4.1 Electrical Cables  
Electrical cables are generally tested to determine their Physical, Mechanical, 
Flammable, Electrical, and Chemical properties so that to determine the level of 
their fire resistance. This section will only deal with fire testing. 
Even though cables are generally not the root cause of a fire they are very often 
subject to its consequences. In most industrial installations the functionality of 
the cable during a fire is not a requirement, except for the circuits that operate 
emergency or safe-shutdown of equipment. These cables will therefore require 
fire-survival properties. 
Cables will behave differently in fires depending on materials components, 
construction of the cable and type of fire. They may contribute to fires in the 
following ways: 
• Propagate flames from one area to another 
• Provide new fuel for combustion and accelerate it 
• Release excessive smoke, toxic and corrosive gasses 
As an example, a mineral insulated cable provides a very low hazard since it 
has copper core and no combustible materials, while polymeric insulated cable 
contains organic materials that would burn and release toxic gasses (e.g. CO2). 
In order to predict the cable performance under fire conditions and their 
subsequent grading numerous small and large-scale tests exist.  
There are two aspects that are necessary to be considered during the 
investigation of the behaviour of cables in a fire: 
• Level of fire resistance (fire survivability) 
• Hazard associated with the combustion of cables in the fire 
When investigating the behaviour of both mineral and polymer cables under fire 
condition the major factors that will help to identify the hazard [26] and that need 
to be to be quantified are: 
• Ease of ignition (flammability) 
• Resistance to propagation (flame spread) 
• Heat of Combustion (heat release) 
• Smoke Emission 
• Toxic gasses evolution 
• Corrosive gas evolution 
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An index of ignition is the flash (spark) ignition temperature and the self-ignition 
temperature. Other important quantifiable indexes are the limiting oxygen index 
and the temperature index. 
To give an example even though wood is easily ignitable it generates 
significantly less heat than polystyrene that instead has a higher ignition 
temperature. 
This specific grading can be determined by a set of tests laid down by different 
normative bodies (e.g. IEC, BS, NES, DEF.STAN, IEEE, NF, VDE etc). 
The main reference international tests on the fire behaviour of cables can be 
found in the following table. 
 
IEC 60331-x Fire-resisting characteristics of electric 
cables 
IEC 60332-1-x 
IEC 60332-2-x 
IEC 60332-3-x 
Test of electrical cables under fire conditions 
(Flame retardant characteristics for electrical 
cables.) 
IEC 60754-1 
IEC 60754-2 
Test on gases evolved during combustion of 
electric cables 
IEC 61034 Measurement of smoke density of electric 
cables burning under defined conditions 
 
There exist also several national variants based on this test (e.g. different fire 
sources, bundles cables etc).  
The following sub-sections present in more detail these reference tests. 
4.1.1 IEC 60331-x: Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - 
Circuit integrity (Ref5 [S1], [S2], [S3]) 
These sets of tests are divided into several parts: 
• Part 11: Apparatus - Fire alone at a flame temperature of at least 750 °C 
• Part 12: Apparatus - Fire with shock at a temperature of at least 830 °C 
• Part 31: Procedures and requirements for fire with shock - Cables of 
rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1 kV 
IEC 60331 - Part 11 deals with the test apparatus to be used for testing cables 
required to maintain circuit integrity when subject to fire alone. The test 
                                                 
5 References beginning with "S" correspond to a standard 
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condition is based upon a flame with a controlled heat output corresponding to a 
temperature of at least 750 °C. 
IEC 60331 - Part 12 deals instead with the test apparatus to be used for testing 
cables required to maintain circuit integrity when subject to fire and mechanical 
shock where. The test condition is based upon a flame with a controlled heat 
output corresponding to a temperature of a nominal 850 °C. It is intended for 
use when testing cables of overall diameter greater than 20 mm. 
IEC 60331 - Part 31 specifies instead the test procedure and gives the 
performance requirement, including a recommended flame application time, for 
cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV required to maintain 
circuit integrity when subjected to fire and mechanical shock under specified 
conditions. It is intended for use when testing cables of overall diameter greater 
than 20 mm. 
This procedure describes the sample preparation, checking arrangements, the 
electrical testing procedure, the method of burning the cables and the method of 
shock production, and gives requirements for evaluating test results. It is to be 
used low-voltage power cables, and control cables with a rated voltage.  
This procedure may be used for cables with rated voltage up to and including 
3,3 kV although the scope is restricted to cables with rated voltage up to and 
including 0,6/1,0 kV. 
4.1.2 IEC 60332 Part 1, Part 2, Part 3: Tests on electric and optical 
fibre cables under fire conditions 
These set of fire tests quantify the fire propagation characteristics of the cable 
under investigation. 
4.1.2.1 IEC 60332-1: Test for vertical flame propagation for a single insulated 
wire or cable (Ref [S4]) 
In this test the vertical flame propagation for a single insulated wire or cable is 
quantified in the following way: a specific length of cable test sample is clamped 
vertically in a metal chamber with an open front side. A gas burner with a 
specific flame length, angle and distance are defined. Two burners are used for 
cables having a diameter greater than 50 mm and the flame is applied for a 
period of time depending on the diameter of the cable. 
4.1.2.2 IEC 60332-2: Test for vertical flame propagation for a single 
insulated wire or cable (Ref [S5]) 
This part of IEC 60332 differs from Part one as it specifies the test apparatus for 
testing the resistance to vertical flame propagation for a single small vertical 
electrical insulated conductor or cable, or optical fibre cable, under fire 
conditions. 
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4.1.2.3 IEC 60332-3: Test for vertical flame spread of vertically-mounted 
bunched wires or cables (Ref [S6]) 
This test investigates the flame propagation for a bunch of cables. The tested 
cable lengths have a specific length and the test duration depends on the 
“number of litres of combustible material in a one-meter sample”. The number of 
samples is also a function of diameter and cross-section of the cables being 
tested. The test samples are locked vertically and there are constraints on the 
total width of the mounted samples. The test chamber has fixed dimensions. 
The flame is of propane gas burner type and its location with respect to the 
cables is well defined. After the burning phase the test will be regarded as 
passed if the charred (affected) length is less than a specific height from the 
bottom edge of the burner. 
4.1.3 IEC 60754 - Part 1 and Part 2: Test on gases evolved during 
combustion of materials from cables  
4.1.3.1 IEC 60754-1: Determination of the amount of halogen acid gas (Ref 
[S7]) 
This procedure describes a method to quantify the amount of halogen acid gas 
(other than hydrofluoric acid) evolved during the combustion of the following 
compounds: 
• halogenated polymers  
• compounds containing halogenated additives taken from cable 
constructions 
It is a method that has a lower threshold detection limit of halogen acid and is 
therefore not suitable for defining compounds or materials described as "zero-
halogen". 
4.1.3.2 IEC 60754- 2: Determination of degree of acidity of gases evolved 
during the combustion of materials taken from electric cables by 
measuring pH and conductivity (Ref [S8]) 
This part of IEC 60754 specifies a method for the determination of the degree of 
acidity of gases evolved during the combustion of compounds taken from cable 
components. It is suitable for all compounds or materials containing less than 5 
mg/g halogen acid equivalent. 
4.1.4 IEC 61034 –Part 1 and Part 2: Measurement of smoke density 
of cables burning under defined conditions - (Ref [S9], [S10]) 
This procedure is used to quantify the emission of smoke that is generated by 
burning cables in conditions that are equivalent to those of a real fire. Smoke 
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density is determined using comparative measurements (important for cable 
applications in specific areas such as on escape routes). 
The test chamber consists of a cube equipped with a light source and a 
photocell installed at a certain level. A fixed air circulation ensures an even 
distribution of smoke. Precautions are taken to avoid flame turbulence. The test 
finishes either when the light transmission does not decrease any more after the 
fire source has been extinguished or the test duration is exceeding 40 minutes. 
The test is considered passed depending on the levels of light transmission. 
The set point levels are levels depending both on cable diameter and number of 
samples 
Part 1 of the procedure describes the test apparatus while Part 2 deals with the 
test procedure and requirements 
4.1.5 Tests conducted in USA 
Historically the first test for cables and Wires is the IEEE-383 (Ref [9], [S21]), 
"IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices and 
Connections for Nuclear Generation Stations". This test procedure, issued in 
1973 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) was intended 
for cables essential for emergency operations in nuclear power plants. 
Revision 2003 provides greater guidance for cable and field splice qualification 
and to clarify the existing principles of qualification provided by IEEE Std 383-
1974. 
A set of other tests derived from the previous one of 1973 were then developed: 
• U.L. 1685 [S11] 
• ICEA T-30-520 [S12] 
• CSA, FT4  
• IEEE 1202  [S22] 
These tests have common parameters such as height and width of tray, heat 
input burner type/fuel conditions, duration of test, spacing between specimens, 
etc. Differences include tray loading, burner orientation, performance criteria. 
4.1.6 Equivalence in national Standardization 
The previous norms are generally transposed directly into the various national 
legislations. 
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It is common to see in the specifications of cable vendors the equivalence of 
norms. For example the fire performance may be presented as follows: 
 
Fire resistant:  IEC 60331, NF C 32-070 Cat. CR1, EN 50200, NBN C 30-004 
F2 FR2 60, BS 6387 CWZ; SS 299 CWZ, BS 8434, BS 2316, BS 
3G 230 
Fire retardant IEC 60332 Part x&y, NF C 32-070 Cat. C1 & C2, EN 50265, EN 
50266,  NBN C 30-004 F2, BS 4066 Part x & y 
Low smoke:  IEC 61034, EN 50268, NF C 32-073, BS 7622 
Halogen free:  IEC 60754, EN 50267, NF C 32-074, BS 6425 
Low toxicity: IEC 60754, EN 50267, NF C 32-074, BS 6425 
Low corrosivity IEC 60754, EN 50267, NF C 32-074, BS 6425 
Critical Oxygen 
Index 
NES 714, BS ISO 4589 (replaces BS 2782) -  ASTM D2863 
Flammability 
Temperature 
Index 
NES 715, ISO 4589-3 
 
 
A specific procedure may also be defined by applying set of norms in cascade. 
For example a specific fire test may be identified as using a general IEC 
standard, plus a CEN/CENELEC procedure and taking into account particular 
requirements (e.g. DIN/VDE standards). 
4.2 Electrical cabinets 
Electrical cabinets are not covered by fabrication norms in term of fire safety. 
However it is possible to find common features for electrical cabinets of a 
Nuclear Power Plant. In [13] they have been categorized according to their 
function and voltage with the following classes: power generation, power 
distribution, control and instrumentation, in case of the function category and in 
the classes high (>480 V), medium (≈480 V), low (<480 V) in case of the 
voltage category. Sizes, ventilation, doors, locking and obviously fire load vary 
according to each class in the resulting matrix. Hence according to this study 
electrical cabinets of a Nuclear Power Plant can be described by a limited 
amount of characteristics, furthermore the studies in [19] and [17] observed that 
the cabinet type has not been identified as being significantly correlated to the 
target failure time. The combustion of electrical cabinets appears to be 
reproducible and hence opens the way to a phenomenological description of the 
fire [17]. All these results indicate that it is possible now to think about defining 
fire standards for electrical cabinets. 
The wall of the electrical cabinet and its content can be considered as a whole. 
Hence the fire and smoke resistance of the cables and boards has to be 
considered. As seen in paragraph 4.1 there are fire safety standards for cables, 
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then these cables should be chosen in correspondence to the qualification level 
of the electrical cabinet. 
Research is being made on the smoke susceptibility of boards and electronics 
but as mentioned in [23] there is currently no practical repeatable testing 
methodology for smoke susceptibility as part of the environment qualification. 
However coating has proved to be very efficient [20] and has been ranked in 
[23]. Coating and nature of the electronics inside the electrical cabinet should 
be part of the qualification procedure. 
The qualification procedure should define typical electrical cabinets according to 
their function and voltage which in turn define their size, inside arrangement 
(e.g. internal shelves) and fuel load.  For these typical classes it becomes then 
possible to define the ventilation and locking. In all studies the venting has been 
found decisive for the development and propagation of the fire and in the mean 
time it is the parameter which can be adjusted in some extend. Such a 
qualification procedure can at best be supported by a theoretical approach like 
the one developed in [27]. In this study a conservative model for predicting the 
Heat Release Rate in the case of fire inside a closed electrical cabinet is 
proposed. However it is acknowledged that the variety and the influence of the 
specific details of electrical cabinets make it impossible to derive a general 
theory. This obstacle can be weakened if a reduce number of classes can be 
defined. In [27] it was supposed that the cabinet was well stirred and two vents 
were provided (lower and upper natural ventilation). The time for reaching the 
HRR peak was found dependant on the venting (through an entrainment 
coefficient) and on the cabinet volume, however both by their cubic root. The α 
factor corresponding to the fire development velocity can be consider as low 
and is given the corresponding value from the NFPA classification (Table 2). A 
coefficient K is set in the model and is defined as an entrainment coefficient. Its 
value is set to 2 or 1 in order to fit experiments in two cases: ceiling vent and 
wall vent respectively. It influences the time to reach the HRR peak through 
(K/α)1/3.  
Considering that the volume of a cabinet as well as its fuel load is not an 
adjustable variable inside an electrical cabinet class, the venting is a 
characteristic which optimisation could be searched in the frame of component 
qualification. Locking should also be part of the qualification procedure since its 
lost corresponds to a sudden and strong venting. 
In conclusion an electrical cabinet should be qualified for: 
• Fuel charge in term of maximal quantity of heat available assuming 100 
% burning: this gives the possibility for mixing material of different 
chemical nature if necessary 
• Geometrical disposition inside the cabinet (influence on venting) 
• Ventilation related parameters (e.g. contraction coefficient like in [9]: this 
quantity refers to the ratio between the volume used by the input/output 
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air and the actual available surface opening and can be exactly 
estimated by cold tests). 
From qualification efforts accompanied by theoretical approach a prediction of 
HRR and time to HRR peak for electrical cabinets can be derived. This in turn 
can be used in PSA studies procuring them a more reliable basis for their 
corresponding estimations. 
 
Fire Growth Rate Fire Growth Parameter Alpha values (kJ/s3) 
Slow  0.0029 
Medium  0.012 
Fast  0.047 
Ultra-Fast 0.188 
 
Table 2: classification of the fires by their growth rate [from 
http://projects.bre.co.uk/frsdiv/designfires/mainframe.htm] 
 
5 Fire related Norms and Standards 
Previous chapters focused on norms and testing procedures for electrical 
cables and electrical cabinets. Another essential aspect for fire progression and 
propagation and its capacity to become a large fire is related to the 
compartment tightness. This report did not consider any experiments and test 
procedures for components ensuring the compartment tightness. However the 
corresponding norms requirements and (sometime) description are listed in the 
following Table 3. The same is done in Table 4 for electrical components. The 
references given in these tables and beginning with "S" are in the list 
"references on Standards".   
The build up of this table is an on-going action and it will be completed and 
adapted throughout the project progress. 
6 Conclusion and recommendations for future 
activities  
Starting from the point of view of a large fire scenario the response of some fire 
safety related equipment was examined. Large fire scenarios are often 
associated to a deliberate action of external origin. Although some aspects of 
prevention for such fires are very specific (power plant access control, 
emergency plan, collaboration with the local fire brigade), the fire load on the 
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components which are designed for limiting the impact of the fire on the nuclear 
safety is not linked to the origin of the fire. In fact a better knowledge of the 
component limits is of interest for the PSA studies as well as for facilitating the 
purchase of new fire resistant equipment for upgrading the fire safety at nuclear 
power plant. 
This study concentrated on the research of developed norms, standards and 
their associated tests corresponding to cables and electrical cabinets. A lot of 
fire norms already exist for electrical cables and their insulation. Although there 
is still a constant experimental effort for improving the fire resistance of cables, 
European norms have been defined and are widely accepted.  
The fire resistance of electrical cabinets is or has been the topic of a limited 
amount of experimental programs. Up to now no norm has been issued. A great 
amount of work has been made on the classification of electrical cabinets, on 
the reproducibility of their behaviour under fire and on identifying the most fire 
relevant parameters or features. The work already made helps developing 
better definition of normative tests for each electrical cabinet class as they can 
be identified at nuclear power plant. The combustibility of the cabinet as well as 
its internal arrangement and it size can be well defined inside a given class. The 
normative feature will then be the vents and the locking. 
Other fire equipment is very important for preventing the fire propagation, such 
as all components constituting passive fire barriers. They were not considered 
in detail in this report however a list of corresponding norms and related tests is 
provided as they are recommended or adopted by nuclear safety authorities in 
Europe, USA, The Russian Federation and Ukraine. The corresponding tables 
will be completed and updated in the frame of the SONIS project.  
In the work program 2008 the project will follow the evolution on new design 
and testing of electrical cables, will launch a discussion with the main key 
stakeholders in the “fire” community to estimate if the knowledge collected on 
fire assessment and testing with regard to electrical cabinets is mature enough 
for entering a phase of determining the corresponding fire safety requirement 
needs and the associated test programmes. Furthermore this next step will 
include fire doors or/and fire dampers. 
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Table 3:  Norms related to propagation prevention 
 
Component Standard or 
Safety rules 
Standard for 
Testing 
Description Country6 
NPB 114-02 
 
NPB 113-03 
NPB 244-97 
 Fire-prevention protection of nuclear power plants. Norms of 
designing. 
Fire safety of nuclear power plants. General requirements. 
Building materials. Decorative-finishing and facing materials. 
Materials for flooring. Roofing, waterproofing, and heat-
insulating materials. Characteristics of fire hazard 
Russian Federation [28] 
Fire Protection 
Regulations on 
Design of NPP 
(VSN 01-87) 
DSTU B V.1.1-4-
98 
Applicable not only for NPPs Ukraine 
[29] 
Structural fire 
barriers (ex. 
Walls, floors, 
ceilings, 
enclosure) 
NFPA 221 [S13] 
 
NFPA 251 [S14] 
ASTM E-119 
[S15] 
Test Standard: 
1. Applies to construction, materials, workmanship as well 
as size of the specimens to be tested. 
2. Acceptance criteria [6]:  
a. The fire barrier design has withstood the fire 
endurance test without the passage of flame or the 
ignition of cotton waste on the unexposed side for 
a period of time equivalent to the fire-resistance 
rating required of the barrier. 
b. The temperature levels recorded on the 
unexposed side of the fire barrier are analyzed 
and demonstrate that the maximum temperature 
does not exceed 121 °C (250 °F) above the 
ambient atmosphere. 
c. The fire barrier remains intact and does not allow 
projection of water beyond the unexposed surface 
USA 
Ref [24] 
 
Fire rating required for 
the fire barriers is either 
1 or 3 hours. 
 
                                                 
6 The Standard may not be issued by the regulatory body of the country but accepted by it. 
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during the hose stream test. 
Digest N0 67/2001 [S24] Code of Czech construction regulations Czech Rep. 
KTA 2101.1  The structural components shall basically be subdivided into 
fire compartments.  
Combustible construction materials shall, basically, be flame 
retardant in accordance with Class B 1 DIN 4102-1: Fire 
behaviour of building materials and building components - 
Part 1: Building materials; concepts, requirements and tests 
Germany [S33] 
RakMK  Code of Finnish construction regulations. Fire protection is 
based on Fire Compartment in the first place 
Foreign regulations and guides can be proposed to be applied 
when the specific features of a nuclear power plant are to be 
considered. In this case it shall, however, be demonstrated that
they form a feasible complex. The guides and technical 
standards to be used must be specified. An acceptance from 
STUK has to be applied for application of foreign regulation 
and guides. 
The separating structural elements shall be manufactured of fire-
resistant materials as presented in RakMK. The surface layers of the 
elements shall belong to class 1 concerning the ignitability 
properties and to class I concerning the fire spreading properties. 
 
Finland 
Fire Protection 
Regulations on 
Design of NPP 
(VSN 01-87) 
DSTU B V.1.1-6-
2001 
Applicable not only for NPPs Ukraine 
[29] 
NFPA 80 [S16]   USA [24] 
Fire doors 
  Must resist at least as well as the wall of the considered fire 
volume. Usually rated 1h30. 
However PSA studies showed that in front of the difficulty to 
estimate fire duration a possibility is also to rate considering 
the time for the fire brigade to come [30].   
 
France [S23] 
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KTA 2101.2 DIN 18 095-1 Smoke control doors; Concepts and requirements Germany [S34] 
STUK Guide YVL 
4.3 
EI 60 / EI 120 Fire compartmentation used in protecting redundant safety-
related systems and separating them from each other shall, in 
general, have a fire resistance of EI-M 120 
 
Finland [S29]  
Fire Protection 
Regulations on 
Design of NPP 
(VSN 01-87) 
  Ukraine [29] 
NFPA 90A [S17] UL 555 [S18] Component Standard: 
Ventilation fire dampers should be installed within the fire 
wall penetration for barriers with a fire rating greater than or 
equal to 2 hours. 
Test Standard: 
Does not evaluate whether or not fire dampers will close 
under airflow conditions. 
NRC position: "Fire damper surveillance testing should 
model airflow 
to ensure that the dampers will close fully when called upon 
to do so" 
USA [24] 
 
KTA 2101.1  Their fire resistance capability shall correspond to that of the 
partitioning structural elements. 
Germany [S33] 
Fire dampers 
  Component Standard: 
Ventilation fire dampers need to have at least the same fire 
rating  as the wall on which they are installed. Shut 
automatically (fuse) at 70  °C. 
 
France [S23] 
NPB 237-97 NPB 237-97 Building constructions. Fire test methods of cable penetrations
and sealed cable inputs (with alteration №1) 
Russian Federation [28] Penetration 
seals 
Fire Protection 
Regulations on 
Design of NPP 
DSTU B V.1.1-8-
2003 
Applicable not only for NPPs Ukraine [29] 
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(VSN 01-87) 
 NFPA 251 [S14] 
ASTM E-119 
[S15] 
ASTM E-814 
[S19] 
IEEE ST. 634 
[S20] 
Test Standard: 
1. Applies to construction, materials, workmanship as well 
as size of the specimens to be tested 
2. Acceptance criteria [6]:  
a. The fire barrier design has withstood the fire 
endurance test without passage of flame or the 
ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a 
period of time equivalent to the fire-resistance 
rating required of the barrier. 
b. The temperature levels recorded for the 
unexposed side of the fire barrier are analyzed 
and demonstrate that the maximum temperature 
does not exceed 163 °C (325 °F) or 121 °C (250 
°F) above the ambient temperature. Higher 
temperatures at through-penetrations may be 
permitted when justified in terms of cable 
insulation ignitability. 
c. The fire barrier remains intact and does not 
allow projection of water beyond the unexposed 
surface during the hose stream test. The stream 
should be delivered through a 38-mm (1.5-in.) 
nozzle set at a discharge angle of 30 percent 
with a nozzle pressure of 517 kPa (75 psi) and a 
minimum discharge of 284 L/m (75 gpm) with 
the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 1.5 m (5 ft) 
from the exposed face, or (2) through a 38-mm 
(1.5-in.) nozzle set at a discharge angle of 15 
percent with a nozzle pressure of 517 kPa (75 
psi) and a minimum discharge of 284 L/m (75 
gpm) with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 3 
m (10 ft) from the exposed face, or (3) through a 
64-mm (2.5-in.) national standard playpipe 
USA 
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equipped with 29 mm (1c in.) tip, nozzle 
pressure of 207 kPa (30 psi), located 6.1 m (20 
ft) from the exposed face. 
NRC position [6]:  QA/QC methods should be in force during 
installation. It may not be practical to test every penetration 
configuration. A limited number of test specimens that have 
been specifically designed to bound the entire population of 
in-plant seal configurations may be acceptable. Rules to be 
observed in this case are given.  
 
HN 18 S 01 HN 18 S 01  France [S23] 
KTA 2101.1  Same fire resistance as the separating structural element Germany [S33] 
STUK Guide YVL 
4.3 
 Same fire resistance as the separating structural element Finland [S29] 
Fire-rated 
cables 
  In principle cannot replace the compartmentalization. May be 
accepted as a measure preventing fire propagation if the 
licensee provides an appropriate demonstration. 
 
  Distance rules  for their position are given  
 
USA 
KTA 2101.2 DIN 4102-9 Construction-supervision approved cable fire shields. Germany [S34] 
Fire Stops for 
Cable Routing
CST 62 C 008 CST 62 C 008 Distance rules  for their position are given  France [S23] 
STUK Guide YVL 
5.6 
  Finland [S30] Ventilation 
systems 
NPB 253-98 NPB 253-98 Equipment of antismoke protection of buildings and 
constructions. Ventilators. The present norm establishes a test 
method on fire resistance of the fans used for mechanical 
creation of draught in systems of emergency antismoke 
ventilation, and also in systems of general ventilation, local 
exhaust ventilation, and the air-conditioning, intended for 
functioning in a mode of antismoke ventilation at fires in 
buildings and constructions of various purposes.  
Russian Federation [28] 
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Table 4: Related to electrical components fire protection  
 
Component Standard Standard for 
Testing 
Description Country 
NPB 248-97 
 
 
 
NPB 238-97 
 
GOST 12176-89 
NPB 248-97 
 
 
 
NPB 238-97 
 
GOST 12176-89 
Electrical cables and wires. General requirements of fire 
safety. Test methods (with alteration №1). The present norms 
apply to cables and wires with a voltage up to 35 KV, 
intended for a lining in cable constructions and premises. 
Flame retardant cable coatings. General technical 
requirements and test methods (with alteration №1). 
Cables, wires, and cords. Test methods of combustion non-
spreading 
Russian Federation [28], 
[S35] 
Fire Protection 
Regulations on 
Design of NPP 
(VSN 01-87) 
GOST 12176-89, 
DSTU B V.1.1-
11-2005 
Cables, conductors and cords. Check methods for flame 
propagation. 
Applicable not only for NPPs. 
Ukraine 
[29], [S35] 
 IEEE St. 383 (old) 
[S21] 
IEEE St. 1202 
(new) [S22] 
 
 
NRC position: 
For (older) cable installations that do not meet the standards, 
(approved) flame-retardant coating is compulsory. 
New reactor fibre optic cable insulation and jacketing should 
also meet the fire and flame test requirements of IEEE 1202.  
Cables important to safety trays should be designed to allow 
wetting down with fire suppression water without electrical 
faulting.  
USA 
Ref [24] 
 
NF C 32-070 NF C 32-070 test 
No 2. 
In case of redundant  cable ways, if they have to fit in same 
cabinet or desk one of the way has to be protected either by a 
fire rated  envelope or a fire resistant painting. 
Rule for cable installation in envelopes. 
  
France [S23] 
Cable Design  
DIN VDE 0250-
214, DIN VDE 
0266, DIN VDE 
 Cables with improved behaviour in the event of fire. 
Additional measure can comprise the use of coatings or of 
special cables. 
Germany [S32] 
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0282-9 and 
DIN VDE 0815/A1
Cable function 
preservation  
DIN 4102-12  Functional Capabilities of fire protection equipment cables Germany [S32] 
 
 
    
  NRC position: 
High-voltage cabinets (i.e ≥ 480 V) should be provided with 
adequate spatial separation or substantial physical barriers to 
minimize the potential for an energetic electrical fault to 
damage adjacent equipment, cables, or cabinets important to 
safety. 
Electrical cabinets containing a quantity of combustible 
materials (e.g., cabling) sufficient to propagate a fire outside 
the cabinet of fire origin should be provided with in-cabinet 
automatic fire detection. 
USA Electrical 
Cabinets 
KTA 2101.3  Switch gear and the instrumentation and control equipment 
shall be housed in metal cabinets.  
Germany [S32] 
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REFERENCES STANDARDS FOR CABLES AND FOR OTHER NPP 
COMPONENTS  
 
S1 IEC 60331-11: Tests for electric cables under fire conditions – Circuit 
integrity – Part 11: Apparatus – Fire alone at a flame temperature, of at 
least 750 °C 
 
S2 IEC 60331-12: Tests for electric cables under fire conditions – Circuit 
integrity – Part 12: Apparatus – Fire with shock at a temperature of at least 
830 °C 
 
S3 IEC 60331-31: Tests for electric cables under fire conditions – Circuit 
integrity – Part 31: Procedures and requirements for fire with shock – 
Cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1 kV 
 
S4 IEC 60332-1: Tests on electric and optical fibre cables under fire 
conditions – Part 1: Test for vertical flame propagation for a single 
insulated wire or cable. 
 
S5 IEC 60332-2: Tests on electric and optical fibre cables under fire 
conditions – Part 2: Test for vertical flame propagation for a single small 
insulated wire or cable. 
 
S6 IEC 60332-3: Tests on electric and optical fibre cables under fire 
conditions – Part 3: Part 3-10: Test for vertical flame spread of vertically-
mounted bunched wires or cables. 
 
S7 IEC 60754-1: Test on gases evolved during combustion of materials from 
cables -Part 1: Determination of the amount of halogen acid gas. 
 
S8 IEC 60754-2: Test on gases evolved during combustion of materials from 
cables Part 2: Determination of degree of acidity of gases evolved during 
the combustion of materials taken from electric cables by measuring pH 
and conductivity 
 
S9 IEC 61034-1: Measurement of smoke density of cables burning under 
defined conditions – Part 1: Test apparatus 
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